A Morally Permissible Moral Mistake? Reinterpreting a Thought Experiment as Proof of Concept by Emmerich, Nathan & Gordjin, Bert
A Morally Permissible Moral Mistake? Reinterpreting a Thought
Experiment as Proof of Concept
Emmerich, N., & Gordjin, B. (2018). A Morally Permissible Moral Mistake? Reinterpreting a Thought Experiment
as Proof of Concept. Journal of Bioethical Inquiry, 1-10. DOI: 10.1007/s11673-018-9845-x
Published in:
Journal of Bioethical Inquiry
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Queen's University Belfast - Research Portal:
Link to publication record in Queen's University Belfast Research Portal
Publisher rights
Copyright 2018 the authors.
This is an open access article published under a Creative Commons Attribution License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/),
which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the author and source are cited.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Queen's University Belfast Research Portal is retained by the author(s) and / or other
copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated
with these rights.
Take down policy
The Research Portal is Queen's institutional repository that provides access to Queen's research output. Every effort has been made to
ensure that content in the Research Portal does not infringe any person's rights, or applicable UK laws. If you discover content in the
Research Portal that you believe breaches copyright or violates any law, please contact openaccess@qub.ac.uk.
Download date:06. Aug. 2018
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
A Morally Permissible Moral Mistake? Reinterpreting
a Thought Experiment as Proof of Concept
Nathan Emmerich & Bert Gordjin
Received: 3 October 2017 /Accepted: 15 January 2018
# The Author(s) 2018. This article is an open access publication
Abstract This paper takes the philosophical notion of
suberogatory acts or morally permissible moral mistakes
and, via a reinterpretation of a thought experiment from
the medical ethics literature, offers an initial demonstra-
tion of their relevance to the field of medical ethics. That
is, at least in regards to this case, we demonstrate that the
concept of morally permissible moral mistakes has a
bearing on medical decision-making. We therefore sug-
gest that these concepts may have broader importance
for the discourse on medical ethics and should receive
fuller consideration by those working the field. The
focus of the discussion we present is on a particular
thought experiment originally presented by Sulmasy
and Sugarman. Their case formed the basis of an ex-
change about the moral equivalence of withdrawing and
withholding life-saving treatment. The analysis
Sulmasy and Sugarman set out is significant because,
contrary to common bioethical opinion, it implies that
the difference between withdrawing and withholding
life-saving treatment holds, rather than lacks, moral
significance. Following a brief discussion of rejoinders
to Sulmasy and Sugarman’s article, we present a con-
structive reinterpretation of the thought experiment, one
that draws on the idea of suberogatory acts or Bmorally
permissible moral mistakes.^ Our analysis, or so we
suggest, accounts for the differing moral intuitions that
the case prompts. However, it also calls into question the
degree to which this thought experiment can be thought
of as illustrating the moral (non)equivalence of with-
drawing and withholding life-saving treatment. Rather,
we conclude that it primarily illuminates something
about the ethical parameters of healthcare when family
members, particularly parents, are involved in decision-
making.
Keywords Withdrawing .Withholding . Equivalence
thesis . Morally permissible moral mistakes .
Suberogatory acts
Introduction
Whilst the notion of the supererogatory (Heyd 2016) has
been considered in relation to certain bioethical issues—
notably altruistic organ donation (Gerrand 1994,
Wilkinson and Garrard 1996, 338) as well as in relation
to medical practice and the profession itself (McKay
2002)—the same cannot be said of suberogatory acts
(Driver 1992) or the closely related idea of morally
permissible moral mistakes (Harman 2015a). These no-
tions are, of course, supposed to parallel the idea of the
supererogatory: acts that are subject to positive moral
evaluations but are not considered obligatory. They
encapsulate the notion that there may be some acts that
are subject to negative moral evaluations but, nonethe-
less, are not morally verboten. As such, it is not
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obligatory to refrain from doing them and, furthermore,
they need not be prevented or condemned outright.
This essay is intended as a Bproof of concept,^ that
is, as a demonstration that, at least in the case
discussed, the idea of a morally permissible moral
mistake is relevant to medical ethics. Given the pre-
sumption that healthcare professionals ought to em-
body the highest of ethical ideals one might be in-
clined to think that we should not accommodate
suberogatory acts. Whilst one might argue this
point—and we offer a couple of further comments
below—the case we discuss concerns the actions of
the parents of two paediatric patients. It is they, and
not the healthcare professionals involved, who make
the morally permissible moral mistake, or so we argue.
Thus, whilst our account is, we think, suggestive,
further discussion of these concepts is required if we
are to determine the ethical significance of the
suberogatory or of morally permissible moral mis-
takes for the practice of medicine and healthcare. As
a result, the extent of our substantive claim is that the
idea of suberogatory acts, or of morally permissible
moral mistakes, can provide insight into the ethical
dimension of situations where healthcare profes-
sionals must deal with patient’s families rather than
patients alone. Thus, they would seem to be important
notions for both medical practice andmedical ethics in
such contexts.
Demonstrating the relevance of these concepts to
this context involves revisiting a discussion about the
moral equivalence of withdrawing and withholding of
life-saving treatment. This discussion begins with a
thought experiment that purports to show that, con-
trary to common bioethical opinion, the distinction
between a treatment being withdrawn or withheld
can have moral significance (Sulmasy and Sugarman
1994). Whilst many healthcare professionals clearly
feel that some moral significance attaches to whether
care is being withheld or withdrawn (Solomon et al.
1993; Dickenson 2000), in the discourse of both bio-
ethics (Orentlicher 2001, chaps. 3 & 4) and profes-
sional guidelines (British Medical Association 2008),
the common opinion is that there is no intrinsic moral
distinction. The presumption that the distinction be-
tween withdrawing and withholding life-saving treat-
ment carries no moral weight is so commonplace that
it is, today, rarely debated. Rather it appears as a
premise in arguments about the moral difference be-
tween withdrawing life-saving treatment and assisted
suicide or the lack thereof (cf. Orentlicher 2001,
chaps. 3 and 4).
The case presented by Sulmasy and Sugarman is,
then, offered as a challenge to a view that is widely held
by those working in the field. They term this view the
Equivalence Thesis (ET) and state it as follows:
1) If it would have been morally permissible to have
withheld a therapy (that has in fact already been
started), then it is now morally permissible to with-
draw that therapy; and:
2) If, in the future, it would be morally permissible to
withdraw a therapy (that has in fact not yet been
started), then it is now morally permissible to with-
hold that therapy (Sulmasy and Sugarman 1994,
218)
In order to account for their analysis of the case they
set out, they introduce Nozick’s Principle of Original
Acquisition of Holdings. Their claim is that the notion
of prior acquisition provides a moral basis for
distinguishing between withholding and withdrawing
life-saving treatment. However, in his reply to
Sulmasy and Sugarman, Harris (1994) suggests that
the case should not be taken at face value. His claim is
that they are comparing an ethical act—in this case the
decision or the decision-making process—with one that
is unethical. They are comparing a just decision to
withhold life-saving medical treatment with an unjust
decision to withdraw it. Given this point, there is a
significant moral difference other than the bare fact of
withdrawing and withholding. He therefore claims that
the case does not provide a challenge to the ET. In an
accompanying editorial, Gillon (1994) presents a similar
view.
This paper interrogates the perspective presented by
Sulmasy and Sugarman, as well as by Harris and Gillon.
As intimated above, we suggest that a more nuanced
understanding of the case can be achieved if we take up
the notion of suberogatory acts (Driver 1992) and what
Harman calls Bmorally permissible moral mistakes^
(2015a). Similar to Harris and Gillon’s view, the picture
we present calls into question the relevance of the case
for the ETand whether the ET is a useful principle when
it comes to the practicalities of withdrawing and with-
holding life-saving medical treatment. This additional
point notwithstanding, if our analysis is convincing
then, at minimum, we will have been successful in
demonstrating that the idea of morally permissible
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moral mistakes has relevance to the medical ethics liter-
ature. Consequently, we hope others will join us in
reflecting on these ideas further and consider if our
ethical understanding of healthcare and medical practice
could be improved by a broader application of these
concepts. However, before pursuing such issues any
further, we first offer a concise account of the way we
understand the terms Bsuberogatory act^ and Bmorally
permissible moral mistakes.^ We then set out the case
presented by Sulmasy and Sugarman before briefly
discussing Harris’ response and Gillon’s editorial. Fi-
nally, we offer a reconstructive analysis of the case in
terms of morally permissible moral mistakes and discuss
the implications of the picture we sketch.
Suberogatory Acts and Morally Permissible Moral
Mistakes
The notion of the suberogatory is conceptualized in
parallel to the more common idea of supererogation.
The idea of supererogation has been subject to continual
and extensive analysis and discussion (Chisholm 1963;
Heyd 1982; Mellema 1991; Postow 2005) since it was
first put forward by Urmson in his seminal article BSaint
and heroes^ (1958). The same, however, cannot be said
of suberogation. Whilst noting there is historical prece-
dent for the category and that some modern philoso-
phers have discussed it, Driver considers suberogation
to be Balmost entirely unknown^ (1992, 286). Further-
more, it remains a controversial notion, and one might
think the same of Bmorally permissible moral mistakes,^
something recently introduced to the literature by
Harman (2015a). As controversial categories of moral
acts that have only recently been recognized, it is un-
surprising that fully articulating them is a complex task.
In order to simplify the challenge we face in doing so,
we will treat the term Bsuberogation^ and the phrase
Bmorally permissible moral mistakes^ as synonymous.
However, one should note that Harman considers
suberogatory acts to either partially overlap with her
conception of morally permissible moral mistakes or
to be a subclass of her notion (Harman 2015a, 370
fn.8). Whilst the limitations of space mean that we are
unable to offer much in the way of broader discussion,
this section sets out what we mean when we refer to
suberogatory acts or morally permissible moral mistakes
in this essay.
In Driver’s view, the idea of suberogation is a coun-
terpart to that of supererogation.1 Acts of supererogation
involve doing something that is morally good but not
morally required. Suberogatory acts involve doing
something that is morally bad but not morally forbidden.
They are instances of poor behaviour which do not rise
to the class of moral wrongs. The following examples
are, at least arguably, instances of suberogation: failing
to follow the social norms of polite discourse; failing to
do (or return) a favour when the opportunity arises; and
failing to donate a kidney to a sibling. Given that there is
no moral obligation to be polite, to do (or even return)
favours, or to donate a kidney to a sibling, any refusal to
do these things is clearly not verboten, or a moral failure.
Nevertheless, one might think that not doing such things
represents some kind of moral error or mistake. Whilst
not doing these things is not morally wrong or worthy of
censure, it is nevertheless the case that not doing them is,
in some way or in some sense, morally bad.2 It is such
thinking that opens up space for the category of
suberogatory acts or morally permissible moral mis-
takes; actions that are morally questionable but, none-
theless, are not forbidden and, in so far as that is the
case, must therefore be considered permissible.
Harman’s conception of morally permissible moral
mistakes is designed to capture a distinction similar to
that of suberogation. In her view all morally wrong acts
are moral mistakes but not all moral mistakes are mor-
ally wrong. These acts are mere moral mistakes, so
called Bbecause it is something the agent should not do
for moral reasons and yet it is morally permissible^
(Harman 2015a, 379 emphasis in original). Again, the
idea is that we can have moral reasons not to do some-
thing but that it is nevertheless permissible to do it. As
with Driver’s distinction between acts that are morally
1 Technically, suberogatory acts are a counterpart to a certain sort of
supererogatory acts, what we might call non-heroic supererogatory
acts. It is commonly thought that supererogation involves a great deal
of self-sacrifice. This is not the case. Supererogatory acts are, simply,
those that are morally good, whilst also being not morally required.
Thus, whilst some supererogatory acts are highly self-sacrificing—
giving all one’s money to charity or sacrificing one’s life to save that
of others, for example—some instances of supererogation are not so
costly. Examples include being polite (obeying social norms), sending
unexpected gifts, or assisting others in some relatively minor way.
2 As Driver notes, using the term Bmorally bad^ as distinct from
Bmorally wrong^ is, at best, awkward. However, Driver is attempting
to capture an often-unrecognized category of acts: those that Bare de-
serving of negative evaluation, without being actually wrong^ (Driver
1992, 286) where those that are actually wrong are Bimpermissible^
whilst those that are merely subject to negative evaluation are
Bpermissible^ or, at least, subject to tolerance and accommodation.
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wrong and those that are morally bad, Harman’s con-
struction of this point can strike one as questionable.
However, consider the fact that whilst one might have
moral reasons not to be rude to other people, it is
nevertheless morally permissible to do so. Similarly,
we may have moral reasons not to withhold favours
from friends or kidneys from siblings. Nevertheless, it
does seemmorally permissible to withhold these things.
One might take Harman’s point as being concerned
with substantive Bdemands^ or Brequirements^ of mo-
rality or, at least, our moral philosophies. In this view,
even if we take Harman to be concerned with ensuring
that our theoretical accounts do not become so onerous
as to be practically untenable, it would seem to have
fundamental implications for the moral reality envis-
aged by moral philosophy. However, one might take
Harman’s point as being concerned with the degree to
which we might censure or, better, accommodate what
appear to us to be the moral failings of others. From this
perspective, the idea of morally permissible moral mis-
takes has less to do with our fundamental moral philos-
ophies than it has to do with the moral realities we
inhabit and the way we wish to structure them. As such,
there is an underlying pragmatism to the idea of morally
permissible moral mistakes. It is a name for acts that
take place within a zone of collective moral uncertainty,
something implied by a pragmatic adoption of moral
pluralism. Consequently, Harman is raising questions
concerning the degree to which we are required to
tolerate or otherwise accommodate acts that we consider
to be morally flawed or mistaken but that fall within this
zone or sociocultural space.
This latter point is at its clearest in Harman’s discus-
sion of moral vegetarianism and the meat eating of
others (2015b). Regardless of the fact of the matter—
if, indeed, there is any such thing—it is clear that moral
vegetarians consider meat eating to be wrong. Given
that a great many individuals who hold such views
inhabit societies where meat eating is widespread there
is, she says, Ba puzzle about accommodation^ (Harman
2015b): how far, if at all, should moral vegetarians
accommodate the meat eating of others? One might
think that moral vegetarians should not purchase and
cook meat for their friends and family. But should they
refuse to patronize retail outlets that also sell meat or any
and all items that rely on animal products? Does this
include products made by those who eat meat? Further-
more, should moral vegetarians refuse to go to restau-
rants that serve meat and, if they do, should they refuse
to split the bill with their meat-eating friends? It is likely
that a vegetarian meal will cost less than one that in-
cluded meat. As a result, splitting the bill could be
considered as subsidizing the meat eating of others as
well as contributing to the profits of a business funda-
mentally built upon the sale of meat. Harman argues that
such apparent contradictions can be understood by
adopting the view that moral vegetarians consider meat
eating to be a morally permissible moral mistake
(Harman 2015a, 390, 2015b). In so doing, Harman is
not claiming that this is, in fact, what moral vegetarians
think. Rather, her point is that the concept of morally
permissible moral mistakes provides a rationale for the
way in which moral motivated vegetarians evidently
accommodate meat eating.
As a result, one might take the notion of morally
permissible moral mistakes as sketching out a category
of action or behaviour that one might consider morally
bad but, nevertheless, be prepared to tolerate or accom-
modate, at least to some degree. Of course, there might
be limits to this tolerance—moral vegetarians might
prefer not to form significant attachments with those
who eat meat—and what might be accommodated in
some contexts may not be accommodated in others.
Nevertheless, it is clear that many of us regularly en-
counter instances of morally objectionable behaviour
and, for the most part, we allow them to pass unchal-
lenged and unremarked. Thus, even if one remains
philosophically sceptical of suberogation or morally
permissible moral mistakes as a theoretical feature of
morality, it is clearly a feature or the moral reality we
actually inhabit. For the purposes of this paper, then,
suberogatory acts and morally permissible moral mis-
takes are morally questionable actions that, neverthe-
less, may require us to tolerate or accommodate them, at
least in some cases.
Sulmasy and Sugarman’s Case
The thought experiment set out by Sulmasy and
Sugarman (1994) involves a pair of infant twins, Prima
and Secunda. Both are suffering from carbon monoxide
poisoning and, clinically speaking, are in exactly the
same position. Without treatment both will die. There
is, however, an available treatment: artificial ventilation.
Unfortunately, the hospital only has one respirator.
Thus, only one infant can receive the life-saving treat-
ment they require. Having no other basis for their
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decision, the healthcare professionals caring for the
twins decide to proceed via a random—which is to say
arbitrary—allocation by, in essence, flipping a coin.3
Fortune favours Prima, meaning that she will receive
treatment and will likely survive. Treatment will there-
fore be withheld from Secunda, and she will almost
certainly die.
Just after this course of action has been initiated, the
parents of Prima and Secunda arrive. Being properly
apprised of the facts, their view is that, because she cries
less than Prima, Secunda should be treated. Whilst
treatment of Prima has already commenced, it has not
yet had any effect. Therefore, or so Sulmasy and
Sugarman stipulate, the clinical status of the infant twins
remains identical. This will, of course, rapidly change.
Sulmasy and Sugarman nevertheless maintain that, even
if only for a very short period, the clinical status of the
twins remains identical immediately after commencing
treatment. Given their thought experiment and its stipu-
lations, the implications of the ET are such that if, as
seems to be the case, it was morally permissible to
withhold treatment from Secunda and treat Prima then,
as nothing of moral relevance has changed, it should
now be permissible to withdraw treatment from Prima
and treat Secunda. Sulmasy and Sugarman nevertheless
suggest that the parents’ request should be rejected.
They therefore argue that this case provides a counter
example to the ET. Sulmasy and Sugarman conclude
that the withholding and withdrawing of life-saving
treatment is not always morally equivalent and that the
ET is false, at least in some cases.
In order to justify the nonwithdrawal of treatment
from Prima, Sulmasy and Sugarman (1994) lay claim
to Nozick’s (1975) Principle of Original Acquisition of
Holdings. They argue that this principle suggests the
commencement of treatment creates a prima faciemoral
entitlement to the continuation and maintenance of that
treatment or, at least, to not having it arbitrarily
discontinued. This claim is not, however, inalienable
and, in some cases, it may be preferable to withdraw
care from one patient rather than withhold it from an-
other, as when reverse triage is practiced, and treatment
is withdrawn from patients who has a significantly
lower chance of survival than those who would die if
left untreated. Nevertheless, Sulmasy and Sugarman
conclude that Bthe Equivalence Thesis is not a universal
law of bioethics^ (1994, 221). They claim that, because
Nozick’s principle can be applied to all those who are
already receiving treatment, there is a morally relevant
difference between withdrawing and withholding life-
saving treatment. If their account is correct, many bio-
ethicists, and certain professional guidelines, are
labouring under a significant misapprehension.
Gillon’s Editorial and Harris’ Response
Sulmasy and Sugarman’s position is predicated on the
view that had the parents been present at an earlier point
in time, it would have been acceptable to act on their
wishes, rather than on the basis of a random allocation.
As Gillon (1994) points out, Sulmasy and Sugarman are
not explicit about this point and, in his rejoinder, Harris
(1994) calls it into question. Harris suggests that, re-
gardless of when they arrive on the scene, those treating
Prima and Secunda should not heed the wishes of the
parents, claiming that the parents are Bare not entitled to
make an unjust choice^ (Harris 1994, 223). His view is,
then, that the parents’ decisions is morally flawed, and
because of this, treating one twin rather than the other on
the basis of the parents’ subjective preferences is unjust
and should be rejected. Given this view, we might
followGillon, who is editorializing against the backdrop
of Harris’ comments, and think a justly made decision
should not be overturned or, at least, not without Bsound
moral reasons for doing so^ (Gillon 1994, 204).
However, say that the parents of Prima and Secunda
were present in the hospital from the beginning, that
they expressed their preference for Secunda to receive
treatment and that, in the absence of any other motiva-
tion, a junior doctor elected to proceed on that basis. If a
senior doctor4 subsequently arrived, would it be accept-
able for this decision to be revisited? If a morally flawed
decision has been made and followed, ought it be retak-
en in a morally just manner by, say, randomly
(re)allocating the scarce resource? Harris’ account
3 The image of flipping a coin is the very definition of random
allocation. However, in all likelihood, were an act of random allocation
to actually take place in practice, one of the healthcare professionals
concerned would simply select one patient to receive treatment. Lack-
ing any relevant basis for making a decision—and in the absence of
any factor likely to invoke unconscious bias—any such selection will
be sufficiently random or arbitrary.
4 Of course, from an ethical point of view, it should not matter if the
initial decision was taken by a junior doctor and subsequently chal-
lenged by a senior doctor. However, for the sake of convenience, we
rely on the fact of medical hierarchy to bolster our narrative.
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seems to suggest that doing so would be acceptable and
he may even take the view that, at least until the clinical
condition of Prima and Secunda diverges, there is a
moral imperative to revisit it. In contrast, Sulmasy and
Sugarman’s account would require some justification to
overcome Secunda’s entitlement to continuation of her
treatment. Depending on the weight they attach to Bprior
acquisition,^ it may mean maintaining the original de-
cision regardless of the Bunjust^ way in which it was
made.
Both Sulmasy and Sugarman and Gillon and Harris,
think that withdrawing treatment on the basis of the
parents’ subjective preference would not be the right
thing to do. We concur with this view. However, we
do not do so in virtue of the principle of original acqui-
sition, rather we agree with Gillon and Harris; the deci-
sion is unjust, and it need not be respected when it
overturns a prior, justly made, decision. However, un-
like Harris and Gillon, we think that, in the absence of a
prior justly made decision, the subjective preference of
the parents may be accommodated and allowed to mo-
tivate an initial allocation of resources. The parents’
decision certainly strikes us suberogatory. Nevertheless,
it can be considered a morally permissible moral
mistake.
A Morally Permissible Moral Mistake?
Given our comments, we think it is possible to defend at
least part of Sulmasy and Sugarman’s view—that is, the
view that it would have beenmorally acceptable to act in
accordance with the parents’ wishes if they had been
present earlier—along the following lines. From the
point of view of the healthcare professionals concerned,
there is no basis for treating either Prima or Secunda.
Only one life can be saved, and both have an equal
claim. As a result, an essentially arbitrary decision must
be made. This can either be done as a matter of random
allocation, or it can be turned over to the parents. The
thought experiment at hand defines the parents’ decision
as subjective and, as a result, might be understood as
bordering on the capricious. Indeed, some parents may
refuse to make this choice, and some might consider it
unethical for healthcare professionals to burden them
with such a decision. Nevertheless, if the parents express
such preferences then it may be that, from the point of
view of healthcare professionals, proceeding on this
basis is no more or less arbitrary than the random
allocation of resources. In short, whilst we may think
that the parents’ decision represents a moral mistake,
having been asked to make it would seem morally
permissible for them to make it in a morally flawed, or
suberogatory, manner. Perhaps they should randomly
—which is to say non-subjectively or arbitrarily, from
their point of view—allocate treatment to one or other of
their children. However, even if we think that they ought
to do so, that does not necessarily mean that we should
intervene if they do not. In this instance, it would be
acceptable for healthcare professionals to accommodate
the parents’ morally flawed decision.
When considering the suggestion that the parents
ought to randomly allocate treatment to one or other of
their children, one might even come to think that there is
something ethically troubling about such an approach.
Whether by flipping a coin or by some equivalent meth-
od, asking parents to make an arbitrary decision regard-
ing their children’s lives would not seem to be a partic-
ularly ethical course of action. Of course, regardless of
how such a decision is to be made, we could say the
same about asking any parents to prioritize the treatment
of one child over another. Furthermore, if one thinks that
an arbitrary or random allocation of resources is, pre-
cisely, one way to avoid making a decision, there seems
no need to ask the parents to decide in the first place.
Nevertheless, asking them to acquiesce to such an ap-
proach to Bdecision-making^ also seems problematic.
At the same time, excluding them from such a decision
would also seem troubling. At best, the situation is non-
ideal, and there does not seem to be an entirely proper
way to proceed.
In this context, then, even though we might regard
the parents’ decision to subjectively favour one twin
over the other as a suberogatory act or a morally per-
missible moral mistake, no other course of action seems
entirely unobjectionable. As it seems to us that there are
ethical concerns with all of the courses of action avail-
able, accommodating a suberogatory decision made by
the parents would not, in itself, be unethical. Indeed, if
the choice is between accepting the decision, and pro-
ceeding despite it being made in a flawed manner, or
rejecting it, meaning that it must be retaken via random
allocation—an act that will implicitly question the moral
status of the original decision and, therefore, those that
made it—then proceeding on the basis of a morally
permissible moral mistake may be the morally best (or
least worst) way forward. It is worth noting that, were
the decision to be retaken, there would be a 50 per cent
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chance that the same twin will receive the treatment and,
therefore, a 50 per cent chance that, excepting the dam-
age done to the relationship between the parents and the
healthcare professionals, nothing will change as a result
of retaking the decision. Whilst this latter point might be
considered by some as carrying little ethical weight it
may, nevertheless, be accorded practical moral signifi-
cance by those who must reject parental decision-
making in order to arbitrarily decide the fate of infant
twins on the flip of a coin. Even if their decision in this
matter is unjust, it seems permissible to act on or ac-
commodate the parents’ subjective preferences. The
decision is made in a suberogatory manner, but it is a
morally permissible moral mistake and, as such,
healthcare professionals are not morally prohibited from
following it.
Implications for the Equivalence Thesis
Given our analytic reconstruction of Sulmasy and
Sugarman’s thought experiment, one might reconsider
its relevance for the ET. In our account of the case, it is
morally permissible for healthcare professionals to with-
hold treatment on the basis of the parents’ suberogatory
decision but, nonetheless, we do not think it is morally
permissible to withdraw treatment on that same basis.
This would seem to undermine the ET. However, if our
account is taken as reflecting something about when it is
and is not acceptable for healthcare professionals to act
in accordance with morally permissible moral mistakes,
then perhaps it should not be taken as informing the ET.5
Our view is that Sulmasy and Sugarman’s thought
experiment can be understood as follows. The parents’
request to stop treating Prima and start treating Secunda
can and should be rejected on the basis that a just
decision has already been taken, and it should not be
revised in an unjust manner. However, were the parents
to be present at an earlier point in time, then it would be
acceptable, if less than ideal, for Secunda to be treated in
accordance with their less-than-just wishes. Making the
decision in this way might be a moral mistake, but given
that there is no morally relevant way to distinguish
between deciding in one way or the other, and given
that the parents’ preference can be considered as being
no less arbitrary than the flip of a coin, then it seems
morally permissible for the parents to decide, even if
they do so in a suberogatory manner.
Such thinking might be consistent with Sulmasy and
Sugarman’s suggestion that there is a moral distinction
between withdrawing and withholding life-saving treat-
ment. Our analysis indicates that it is permissible to
withhold treatment on the basis of a suberogatory act,
but that the same act should not be allowed to motivate
the withdrawal of care. Alternatively, because Sulmasy
and Sugarman’s discussion does not attend to the way in
which the decisions are being made, we might agree
with Harris’ view that the cases are not as comparable as
Sulmasy and Sugarman suggest: one involves acting in
accordance with a decision-making process that is just
(random allocation) whilst the other involves acting in
accordance with a decision-making process that is un-
just (the subjective preference of the parents). Once this
is seen as an important factor in the case, then what was
previously accommodated as a morally permissible
moral mistake may, if and when it overturns the just
allocation of resources, be seen as a morally objection-
able request. If so, then we have uncovered a heretofore-
unrecognized moral difference between the instances of
withdrawing and withholding in Sulmasy and
Sugarman’s thought experiment.
This difference is, of course, related to the points
made by Harris and Gillon. Nevertheless, it is more
nuanced than their account would indicate. At least in
some cases, it may be acceptable to accommodate mor-
ally suboptimal decision-making processes. Rather than
being unjust per se, such cases can be considered as
suberogatory acts or morally permissible moral mis-
takes. Such acts are certainly less than ideal and, as we
have suggested, it may be that the same or similar
decisions should be accommodated in some cases but
not in others. Nevertheless, in the absence of a prior,
justly made, decision, we might tolerate a morally mal-
formed decision; we might not insist on it being retaken
in a just manner. This could be taken as indicating the
realities of clinical practice are such that the ET is a
rather blunt tool and one that does not offer much in the
way of insight into the moral landscape of withdrawing
and withholding life-saving medical treatment. Thus,
whilst our analysis of this case does not present a
5 It is worth being explicit at this point. Whilst the principle of prior
acquisition introduces a moral difference between the two iterations of
the thought experiment Sulmasy and Sugarman consider, this does not
mean their comparison cannot inform the ET. This is because the
difference is directly linked to the matter of withdrawing and with-
holding life-saving treatment. When we withdraw treatment, we with-
draw what was previously acquired; when we withhold treatment, we
withhold something that that has not yet been acquired.
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challenge to the ET—the relevant iterations of the case
differ in a morally significant, if nuanced, manner—it
contributes to our sense that the ET does not construc-
tively shape the debate on withdrawing and withholding
life-saving medical treatment.
Implications for Dealing with Family Members
Healthcare professionals are often placed in positions
that are less than ideal. In such contexts, they must do
their best to discharge their responsibilities and do so in
a manner that is ethical. Although it may be that the
issue of conscientious objection can be fruitfully ex-
plored through the notion of morally permissible moral
mistakes, this essay does not propose to incorporate
such ideas into professional medical ethics; our intuition
is that, with the possible exception of codifying guide-
lines for matters of contentious objection, professional
guidelines should not detail a set of Bmoral mistakes^
that are acceptable for healthcare professionals to make.
Consequently, the issue of morally permissible moral
mistakes is likely to be of primary interest insofar as the
often less-than-ideal circumstances encountered by
healthcare professionals may include instances where
other people may make moral mistakes and where it
might be permissible for them to do so. This includes
making decisions in a suberogatory manner.
As a result, the primary question we should con-
sider concerns when, and under what circumstances,
might healthcare professionals be justified in rejecting
morally permissible moral mistakes and when might
they be accommodated? In cases where patients are
making decisions for themselves, this seems relatively
unproblematic. Whilst we do not accept the will of
patients whose decision-making is disordered in some
way, it seems clear that we tolerate, and even respect,
the wishes of patients whose decision-making appears
ill judged or misguided. The sovereignty we are enti-
tled to exercise over ourselves—our autonomy—
means that patients are generally free to make moral
mistakes when it comes to making treatment deci-
sions. There may, of course, be questions about how
the patient’s decision impacts on others and any moral
significance this might have. Nevertheless, our socio-
political context is such that individuals have a great
deal of latitude when it comes to making decisions for
and about ourselves. Therefore, in such cases, there
seems significant scope for morally flawed decisions
to be considered permissible. However, when others
become involved in making decisions for patients,
healthcare professionals must more closely examine
whether or not particular moral mistakes are permis-
sible; they must consider if something is indeed a
moral mistake or whether it is a moral wrong. The
question posed by the phenomenon of suberogatory
acts is, then, a matter of when we are required to
challenge, intervene, or otherwise prevent such moral
mistakes from determining the course of action to be
taken in relation to non-autonomous patients and
when we should not.
It seems to us that the actions of parents who make
decisions based on their subjective preference for one
child over another fall into the category of a morally
permissible moral mistake, at least in some contexts.
Viewed in this way, we can understand why it is that
healthcare professionals may find themselves acting
in accordance with these suberogatory decisions rath-
er than challenging them. Of course, they may raise
some form of challenge, at least in some cases and
particularly in the context of shared decision-making.
Nevertheless, even after raising some form of objec-
tion, they may ultimately decide to accommodate
what they consider to be a mere moral mistake. Equal-
ly, we can appreciate that when a suberogatory deci-
sion contradicts a pre-existing and justly made deci-
sion, some healthcare professionals might refuse to act
upon them. As a myriad of media reports make clear,
there is significant scope for conflict between
healthcare professionals and family members regard-
ing patient care.6 To suggest that family members are
not subject to the same ethical standards as healthcare
professionals is, of course, fairly commonplace. How-
ever, the point that healthcare professionals may be
required to tolerate and even respect suberogatory
decisions made by family members has not previously
been examined. This may be directly relevant to a
range of issues in end-of-life care. For example,
whether or not family members ought to be able to
prevent the retrieval of organs from an individual who
is a registered organ donor has been the subject of
some debate (Wilkinson 2007). In the context of the
above discussion and Driver’s (1992) comments
6 At the time of writing, the most pertinant recent case is that of Charlie
Gard, which generated a great deal of media coverage. As part of that
coverage, The Guardian reported that the English courts had dealt with
ten similar cases in the first sixmonths of 2017 (Doward and Robertson
2017).
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about directed living donation mentioned above, we
might think that, given it represents a moral failure to
respect the wishes of the deceased registered organ
donor, any family veto of post-mortem donation is an
example of a morally permissible moral mistake. In-
deed, we might think that it is a moral mistake to
refuse to consent to post-mortem organ donation in
general. Nevertheless, one might think that such a
mistake ought to be considered morally permissible
and that we ought not disregard them, as some have
argued (Harris 2003).
Such thinking might be extended to cases where
family members request inappropriate treatment for
dying patients. Examples include CPR, continued life
support, or the aggressive treatment of infections,
such as pneumonia. Even if the healthcare profes-
sionals concerned would not recommend such treat-
ment, and may even consider it unethical to do so, it
may not be unethical to provide it given family re-
quests. Furthermore, in some cases, we may be justi-
fied in revisiting decisions that have already been
taken. Family members cannot, of course, compel
healthcare professionals to provide inappropriate care.
Nevertheless, there is a significant Bgrey area^ that
provides for uncertainty. In this context, healthcare
professionals do not autonomously decide what to
do, and a decision-making process may include family
members. In pursuing a shared approach to decision-
making, we should recognize that we have opened the
door to the involvement of morally permissible moral
mistakes in healthcare. As a result, healthcare profes-
sionals may need to accommodate decisions that are
moral mistakes but are, nevertheless, permissible.
Consider the following example. It may be a moral
mistake for the family of a frail and incompetent ninety-
year-old to request CPR for their elderly relative. Nev-
ertheless, it may be morally permissible for them to
make such a mistake and for healthcare professionals
to provide CPR on that basis. This should not, of course,
mean that those providing care should abandon any
involvement in such decisions. Healthcare professionals
should, of course, engage with families, present their
views, and share in the decision-making process. How-
ever, in cases where an impasse has been reached,
healthcare professionals may need to tolerate or other-
wise accommodate decisions that they feel are moral
mistakes and, as a result, provide CPR that is unlikely to
succeed or, pace our discussion, treat a child on the basis
of the parents’ subjective preferences.
Conclusion
Our view of Sulmasy and Sugarman’s case is that it is a
morally permissible moral mistake for parental deci-
sions to be predicated on a subjective preference for
one child over another. Where this preference is
expressed prior to any other justly made decision being
taken, healthcare professionals might accommodate this
preference and proceed accordingly. However, where
this preference is expressed following a just decision-
making process, they may legitimately ignore it. As
such our analysis of the case does not pronounce any
clear judgement on the ET; it falls foul of the ET’s
ceteris paribus clause. All other things are not equal as
there is an ethically significant difference between the
instances of withholding and withdrawing life-saving
treatment being compared. In the former instance, the
decision is a morally permissible moral mistake. As a
result, it may be accommodated without further error. In
the latter instance, the parents’ decision would revise a
justly made allocation of resources; accommodating it
would involve an additional—and impermissible—
moral mistake the part of healthcare professionals. How-
ever, whilst we cannot support Sulmasy and Sugarman’s
approach to denying the validity of the ET, we feel our
analysis contributes to a growing sense that viewing
withholding and withdrawing as morally equivalent is
a relatively blunt perspective on the matters at hand.
In addition to its implications for the ET, our anal-
ysis illuminates something that has, as yet, gone un-
remarked in the medical ethics literature. This is the
notion that there is a class of actions, including deci-
sions, that falls into the category of morally permissi-
ble moral mistakes. Healthcare professionals may en-
counter such suberogatory acts when dealing with
family members. The question that must now be ad-
dressed is whether or not we can reliably identify such
cases and how healthcare professionals ought to re-
spond when they do so. In her analysis of whether, and
to what degree, vegetarians ought to accommodate the
meat eating of their non-vegetarian friends, Harman
represents the concept of morally permissible moral
mistakes as having explanatory power; it allows us to
understand the common behaviour of vegetarians with
regard to meat eating and meat eaters. However, we
take the notion as having some degree of normative
significance. Harman’s account does not just explain
the behaviour of vegetarians but, now that it has been
presented, may be taken as guiding future behaviour.
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Of course, there remains room for further argumenta-
tion and reflection as well as for individual differ-
ences; some vegetarians may accommodate what they
see as the morally permissible moral mistake of meat
eating to greater or lesser degrees. As there is no broad
class of morally permissible but morally mistaken
actions that patients often undertake, we do not pres-
ent an argument to the effect that healthcare profes-
sionals ought to accommodate some specific behav-
iours. Nevertheless, if and when healthcare profes-
sionals find themselves concerned about the choices
of patients, reflecting on whether or not the action falls
into the category of morally permissible moral mis-
takes or if it is morally impermissible for them to act in
this way, could offer normative guidance on how they
might respond.
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